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Commentary: The Federalization of Nonprofit 
Regulation and Its Discontents 
James J. Fishman' 
INTRODUCTION 
WE live in an age where charitable organizations are under increasing federal regulatory scrutiny. The Internal Revenue Service (the 
"Service"), at the instigation of the Senate Finance committee-the 
Service's primary congressional overseer-has commenced a corporate 
governance initiative by issuing announcements and guidelines, as well as 
providing educational advice as to how charities' internal affairs should be 
ordered. The Service also has revised the Form 990 Annual Information 
Return, a publicly available document, so that it contains mandatory 
corporate governance questions.2 Nonprofit organizations traditionally 
have been creatures of state law and overseen by state agencies and 
regulators.3 What is unique about the corporate governance initiative is the 
Service's admission that it lacks express statutory authority for this effort. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN 
REGULATION OF CHARITIES 
Until the twentieth century, the federal government had no interest 
in the regulation of charities. The introduction of the federal income tax 
changed that. Charities have been granted preferential federal tax status 
under the Internal Revenue Code since the Revenue Act of 1894.4 The 
automatic nature of obtaining tax exemption and the deductibility of 
[ Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. © 20[ [ James J. Fishman. 
2 SeeIRS FORM 990 (2010), Part VI. 
3 This issue is developed in James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS's Nonprofit 
Corporate Governance Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, 548 (2010). 
4 Revenue Act of [894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. This statute was declared uncon-
stitutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trost Co., [58 U.S. 60[, 637 ([895), because it was a 
direct tax not apportioned according to a state's population. The Sixteenth Amendment cured 
this objection by allowing individuals' incomes to be taxed without regard to each state's 
population. There was a personal tax in the Revenue Act of 186[, ch. 45, § 49, [2 Stat. 292, 
309, but it was never implemented. The Revenue Act of [862, ch. [[9, § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473 
imposed an income tax to finance the Civil War. The Corporation Excise Tax Act of [909 
contained an exemption for charities in language that parrots most of the modern §501(c)(3). 
See Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38,36 Stat. [[,I [3. 
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contributions initially encouraged this lack of federal oversight.s Federal 
tax law relating to nonprofits has not evolved consistently, but has resulted 
from politics, policies, and responses to abuses of tax-exempt status brought 
to Congress's attention. 
Marion Fremont-Smith has identified three stages in the federal 
development of charity regulation.6 In the first, which lasted roughly 
until the 1940s, broad definitional parameters were established as to the 
boundaries of charity status. This enabled donors to deduct charitable 
contributions to certain non profits from their own tax liability. This stage 
generally relied upon self-policing to assure accountability.7 A primary 
catalyst of federal scrutiny was the private foundation, which raised 
suspicions as far back as 1914.8 
Private foundations were equal opportunity offenders. To those on 
the right, they promoted controversial activities such as civil rights and 
voter registration in favor of discriminated and disenfranchised minorities. 
The left believed foundations protected the affluent, shielded large pools 
of wealth from taxation, and possessed a shadowy behind-the-scenes 
influence. Periodic abuses were publicized in the press and taken up by 
5 
The essence of the advantage of [the coordinate privileges of tax 
exemption and deductibility) is that it is automatic. The government 
does not control the flow of funds to the various organizations; the re-
ceipts of each organization are determined by the values and the choic-
es of private givers. The donors determine the direction of their own 
funds, and the distribution of "tax savings" as well. The income of each 
individual organization is a product of donations it receives and the in-
vestment wisdom of its managers. Since all of these operations are out of 
the hands of government under the exemption and deduction statutes, 
the beneficiary organizations receive their governmental aid without 
having ro petition for it. 
Chauncey Belknap, The Federallncome Tax Exemption of Charitable OrganiZlJtions: Its History and 
Underlying Policy, in 4 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY ThE COMM'N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY 
AND PUB. NEEDS 2025, 2039 (1977), available at http://www/eric.ed.gov/PDFS/EDI43606.pdf 
(papers compiled by Department of the Treasury). 
6 MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE 
LAW AND REGULATION 300 (2004). 
7 Id. 
8 In 1914 the United States Commission on Industrial Relations, known as the Walsh 
Commission, learned that the Rockefeller Foundation was to study industrial relations and-
fearing a whitewash-in turn studied Rockefeller. Two years later, it published a report which 
claimed that the concentration of wealth in large foundations was used by industrial magnates 
to control leading universities. The majority of the Commission recommended federal char-
tering of all "nonprofit organizations with more than one function and funds of more than 
$1 million," as well as federally imposed limitations on size, accumulation of unexpended 
income, and duration. It also called for strict supervisory procedures. Nothing came of these 
proposals. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 6, at 68 (citing COMM'N ON INDUS. RELATIONS, INDUS. 
RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY, S. Doc. No. 64-415, at 85 (1st Sess. 1916». 
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Congress.9 
The second stage marked the creation of a border between exempt and 
nonexempt organizations. During the 1940s, Congress became concerned 
that individuals were using tax-exempt organizations to shelter or avoid 
taxable income lO and reacted to these perceived abuses with the Revenue 
Act of 1950. This legislation added sections to the Internal Revenue 
Code that taxed the unrelated business income of most tax-exempt 
organizations ll and denied exemption to feeder corporations by providing 
that an organization primarily engaged in a trade or business for profit 
did not qualify for exemption merely because its profits were destined 
for charitable ends.12 Another provision prohibited certain charities from 
accumulating unreasonable income in such a manner that would jeopardize 
the carrying out of the charity's exempt purposes.13 Also, some charities 
would lose their exemptions if they entered into certain kinds of self-
dealing transactions or granted excessive compensation. 14 The last two 
limitations applied only to charitable organizations, which would later be 
defined as private foundations~ 15 Public charities were exempted from 
these restrictions because they were viewed as less susceptible to abuses. 16 
This period introduced procedures for applying for recognition 
of tax-exempt status and filing an annual information return. Prior to 
1950, the Service's initial focus on charities was at the front end-i.e., 
assessing whether an existing- organization that caught its attention met 
9 See FREMONT-SM[TH, supra note 6, at 67-68; JAMES J. F[SHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, 
NONPROFIT ORGAN[ZATIONS 7 [2-7 [5 (4th ed. 20 [0); Laurens Williams & Donald V. Moorehead, 
An Analysis of the Federal Tax Distinctions Between Public and Private Charitable Organizations, in 
4 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMM'N ON PR[VATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUB. NEEDS, 
supra note 5, at 2099, 210 [-02. 
[0 In [948, the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce investigated the 
economic situation of the textile industry in New Hampshire and came across the operations 
of Royal Little, president of Textron, Inc., who used private foundations to finance Textron 
business ventures. The investigation and Little's transactions are discussed in Comment, The 
Modern Philanthropic Foundation: A Cntique and a Proposal, 59 YALE L.J. 477, 492-97 ([950). 
[[ I.R.C. §§ 5[2-[4 (2006) (codified by Revenue Act of [950, ch. 994, § 30[(a), 64 Stat. 
906,947-50). 
[2 I.R.G § 502 (2006) (codified by Revenue Act of [950, ch. 994, § 30[(b), 64 Stat. 906, 
953)· 
[3 FREMONT-SM[TH, supra note 6, at 60. 
[4 I.R.C. § 503 (20[ [) (codified by Revenue Act of [950, ch. 994, § 30[(a), 64 Stat. 906, 
947-50). The House Ways and Means Committee had wanted to prohibit self-dealing com-
pletely, but the Senate Finance Committee and the combined Conference Committee weak-
ened the provision to require arms-length standards. Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private 
Foundation Low: Historical Perspective on Its Origins and Underpinnings, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX 
REV. 52, 53-54 (2000). 
[5 FREMONT-SM[TH, supra note 6, at 60-61. 
[6 /dat 61. 
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the requirements for tax-exempt statusY It was not until 1954 that a 
purportedly exempt organization had to obtain a determination from the 
Service that it was entitled to that status, though with the exception of 
churches, almost all organizations that relied on contributions did obtain 
stich a ruling from the Service. IS 
In 1942, the Treasury Department requited all tax-exempt organizations 
to file an annual information return, a two-page form that covered the 
1941 tax year and consisted of three questions, an income statement, and 
a balance sheet.19 Some organizations protested, so the next year the 
Treasury Department sought statutory authority from Congress to seek 
financial information from charities.20 Congress required certain exempt 
organizati'ons, principally foundations, to file returns that would disclose 
their financial affairs.21 No one could have imagined from such a modest 
beginning that Form 990 would exponentially expand in page-length 
and importance to become the principal disclosure tool for government 
oversight of exempt organizations.22 
In· the third phase came an expansion in the Service's regulatory 
function. Again private foundations were the catalysts for Congressional 
action. The result was the adoption in 1969 of a complicated enforcement 
regime by which private foundations and their managers were regulated 
more strictly than public charities.23 Sections 4940 to 4945 were added 
to the Internal Revenue Code and imposed a sliding scale of excise taxes 
(depend inK upon the offending foundation's willingness to correct its 
wrong) for abuses in which Congress felt private foundations were most 
likely to engage. The excise tax in the first instance of a violation replaced 
the draconian penalty of revocation of exempt status, the only previous 
i7 Cf Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Ptedicadores, 263 O.S. 578 (1924). 
18 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 6, at 61. In 1954, Department of the Treasury made fil-
ing an exemption mandatory, for which the organization received a determination letter that 
recognized its exemption. Treas. Reg. § I.501(c)(3)-I(b)(6) (2009). 
19 Treasury's authoriry to impose this requiremellt was contested and compliance was 
poor. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 6, at 65. 
20 It!. at 59,65. 
21 Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-235, § 117,58 Stat. 21, 37 (1944). Excluded from 
this filing requirement were churches and other religious organizations, certain educational 
institutions, and certain publicly supported organizations. One purpose of the 1943 legislation 
was to provide Congress with sufficient information to determine if further legislative restric-
tions were needed. Williams & Moorehead, supra note 9, at 2101. 
22 The form has continually been revised to contain more information. All private foun-
dations and most other § 501(c)(3) charities' annual reports are online with GuideStar. See gen-
erally GUIDESTAR, http://www2.guidestar.orglHome.aspx(lastvisited Mar. 31, 201 I). FREMONT-
SMITH, supra note 6, at 65-67, tracks the changes in the form. 
23 This is a dauntingly complex area of the law. The description here does not do it 
justice. For elementary overviews, see FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 6, at 264-85; FISHMAN & 
SCHWARZ, supra note 9, at 672-99. For more technical analysis, see BRUCE R. HOPKINS & JODY 
BLAZEK, PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS: TAX LAW AND COMPLIANCE (3d ed. 2008 & Supp. 2010). 
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remedy. In 1987, the excise tax approach to regulatory violations migrated 
to the public charity sector to curb lobbying abuses and political activity.z4 
A fourth phase of federal oversight has now emerged where federal 
fiduciary norms of behavior have been applied to all §. SOl(c)(3) charities, 
effectively replacing the primacy of state law. This stage began in 1996 
with the enactment of the so-called intermediate sanctions legislation that 
imposed an excise tax on "excess benefit transaction[s]" by "disqualified 
person[s],"-insiders who received excessive compensation.z5 This use of 
the excise tax approach to penalize excess benefit transactions in public 
charities differed from its use to punish violations of the lobbying and 
political restrictions. Previously, Congress had not addressed the setting 
of compensation, an area primarily governed by state nonprofit law. The 
intrusion of federal regulations into areas historically· reserved for state 
governance and oversight expanded significantly with the Service's 
corporate governance initiative. The four papers commented upon herein 
examine aspects of this development. 
II. THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 
Professor Johnny Rex Buckles's paper, The Federalization of the Duty of 
Loyalty Governing Charity Fiduciaries,z6 offers a creative and rich analysis of 
its subject matter. He develops an interesting categorization of conflict 
of interest standards in the federal tax regime: supra-trustee, trustee, and 
nonprofit-corporate-director.z7 The three standards address very different 
problems. The affected organizations, in a sense, inhabit alternative 
universes within this enormous grouping called the nonprofit sector. 
A conundrum with the federalization of the duty of loyalty is that it 
blends different issues and problems and upsets the federal/state balance. 
The federal government and the states have different fish to fry. States 
historically are more attuned to organizations' mission attainment. This 
is the reason for the relaxation of nonprofit corporate requirements for 
conflicts of interest. The federal concern is with the proper use of foregone 
tax revenues. Z8 
State fiduciary standards are appropriate throughout much of the 
nonprofit sector, but state enforcement mechanisms and resources are 
24 I.R.C. §§ 4912, 4955 (2006). 
25 I.R.C. § 4958 (West Supp. 2010). 
26 Johnny Rex Buckles, The Federalization of the Duty of Loyalty Governing Charity 
Fiduciaries, 99 Ky. L.J. 645 (2011). 
27 Id. at6n 
28 Duty of loyalty violations can extend beyond the prohibition against private inure-
ment, which is a violation dealing with insiders. See Buckles, supra note 26, at 16; see also 
United Cancer Council,Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176-77 (7th Cir. 1999) For example, a 
non-insider, a low-level employee, may be guilty of disloyalty but not inurement. 
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inadequate. The strength of the federal interest in duty of loyalty issues 
rests on certain types of organizations where abuses have tended to occur. 
For most of the sector, the problems and concerns addressed by Congress 
with the corporate governance initiative may not be an issue, or if they are, 
no one really knows the extent of the abuses. 
Professor Buckles argues that the governmental interest in requiring 
substantial fairness in conflict of interest transactions is strong, and that its 
interest in requiring procedural fairness is defensible.29 State law, however, 
provides adequate requirements of fairness for nonprofit corporations 
and trusts for most types of organizations. I disagree that administrative 
efficiency is quite so important as Professor Buckles suggests, because the 
federalization of standards and their enforcement creates inefficiencies and 
costs for nonprofit organizations. I also question the value of uniformity of 
loyalty standards. The driving concept of the ALI's Principles of the Law of 
Nonprofit Organizations-that an organization's legal structure should not 
determine the applicable fiduciary standards-initially appealed to me. 
However, it may be that in some situations different organizational forms 
should have separate standards. 
The author speaks of the inconsistencies of most fiduciary standards 
except for the nonprofit corporate directors' standard for unaffiliated 
public charities.30 Congress responds to perceived problems as they 
occur. Congress has not considered fiduciary problems in a coherent way. 
Its attitudes towards fidl!ciary duties seem similar to the expansion and 
contraction of organizations entitled to exemption under § 501. By contrast, 
when the Service acts, it does so consistently across all parts of the sector. 
Thus, there is a discrepancy between Congress's approach and that of the 
Service in corporate governance. Professor Buckles's paper justifies an 
examination by Congress of the inconsistencies he points out in applying 
the duty of loyalty to the regulation of non profits. 
III. CHOKING OUT LOCAL COMMUNITY SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS 
Professor Nicole Dandridge has done a real service in pointing out 
the size and impact of smaller charitable non profits, their importance in 
our communities, and the governance initiative's burdens upon them. 31 
Despite their numerical superiority, smaller non profits tend to be slighted 
or given lip service when considering regulation of the sector and the 
burden of governance upon these organizations. 
Statistical data on smaller non profits is very soft. Professor Dandridge 
29 Buckles, supra note 26, at 685-87. 
30 /d. at 3680-8J. 
31 Nicole S. Dandridge, Choking Out Locol Community Service Orgonizations: Impoct ond 
Implicotions of Recent Upsurge in Federol Regulotion Imposed Upon Smoll Community Nonprofit ond 
Choritoble Entities, 99 Ky. L.J. 695 (20 II). 
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presents many interesting facts about this enormous, yet unknown part of 
the nonprofit universe. While it may be useful for the Service to obtain 
information on smaller organizations in the sector through the new Form 
990-N, loss of exemption for failing to file seems a heavy price for small tax-
exempt organizations that are operating yet flying under the Service's radar. 
Many may lack the capability of filing electronically, which is the only way 
the Service will accept the form. As Professor Dandridge points out, the 
result of noncompliance with the seemingly innocuous 990-N will be the 
loss of tax exemption by many operating organizations, a devastating event 
to the organization in terms of donor relationships and financial viability. 
Restoration of exempt status may not be so easy. Professor Dandridge also 
points out that the costs to re-file and the complexity of Form 1023 will 
create barriers to reentry.3Z 
For organizations filing Form 1023, there are relatively recent 
demands for applicants to have certain corporate governance procedures 
and practices in place. These practices and procedures appear in Form 
1023's questions and raise new expectations for organizations applying 
for recognition of tax-exempt status. There is no data to my knowledge 
about the extent of fraud in smaller organizations or whether conflicts of 
interest policies and board independence are truly helpful in increasing 
the probity of smaller non profits. Yet, the clear implication of Form 1023 
is that organizations should spend substantial amounts of time thinking 
about corporate governance procedures. The increased burdens of filling 
out Form 1023 make it more likely organizations will have to spend scarce 
funds to hire a specialist to assist in completion of the form.33 
Overregulation of smaller organizations, if not a disincentive to their 
full formation, may impact their ability to attract volunteers and their 
continuance. As Professor Dandridge points out, smaller nonprofits are 
unlikely to have counsel except in cases of emergency or when faced with 
perceived Service governance mandates.34 Often smaller organizations 
believe elaborate governance procedures will make it easier to attract 
funding. The focus on procedure necessarily takes away resources and 
makes more difficult mission attainment and fundraising.35 The full Form 
32 Dandridge, supra note 31, at 721-22. 
33 I have very mixed feelings about creating new nonprofits and almost always recom-
mend to people who want to form a new organization to find a fiscal sponsor so the organiza-
tion can use the sponsors' tax exemption. The sponsor can handle books and filing require-
ments until the organization reaches a certain size and indicates viability. I also recommend 
to organizers and their counsel, if they have one, GREGORY COLVIN, FiSCAL SPONSORSHIP: 6 
WAYS TO Do IT RIGHT (2006), an excellent resource for organizations contemplating a fiscal 
sponsorship arrangement. 
34 Dandridge, supra note 31, at 701-02. 
35 An example of this is that an IRS official mentioned in November 2009 that sixty-
six percent of organizations that filed the then new Form 990 were eligible to file the Form 
990-EZ. Simon Brown, Most EOs That Filed the New Form 990 Could Hove Filed the 990-EZ, 
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990 must be filled out by a specialist, which smaller organizations can 
hardly afford. It also must be reviewed by the board of directors.36 
I agree with Professor Dandridge's citation to the comment in the 
report of the Service's Advisory Committee on Tax Exempt and Governmental 
Entities that "[g]eography, size, type of activities the organization engages 
in, and the make-up of its leadership must be considered when deciding 
which governance practices will be most successful and appropriate for a 
nonprofit organization."37 Although there has been lip service for this, it 
tends to get lost when translated to small organizations. 
I thought a very interesting part of the paper was the discussion of 
the concepts of responsive regulation and new governance, both of which 
present useful frameworks within which to examine and debate these 
regulatory issues. The Service was responsive to outside comments in 
the redrafting of Form 990, but there was relatively little evidence of 
interaction with and concern for smaller nonprofits. The Independent 
Sector's Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice,38 as useful as 
they are to larger organizations, may be more burdensome than relevant to 
smaller nonprofits. Hopefully, the coming review of Form 1023 will result 
in increased participation by small organizations. 
Professor Dandridge's suggestion of a restoration of exemption procedure 
short of reapplication for organizations that have missed the 990-N deadline 
and thereby lost their exemption is an excellent recommendation. The 
Service could have a procedure similar to that in effect for churches when 
they engage in political activity. If the church says it will discontinue the 
activity, the exemption is renewed.39 Of course, churches don't have to file 
a Form 1023, but a similar procedure could attach to an operating nonprofit 
Says IRS Official, 64 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 570 (2009). There are several reasons for this: ap-
proximately thirty states accept Form 990 as a substitute for the state annual filing form, but 
they may not accept Form 990-EZ; organizations may file the full Form 990 to impress upon 
donors that they are mature and have the recommended level of transparency; filing Form 990 
requires paid specialist assistance from accounting firms or consultants who have their own 
interest in pushing the filing of the full Form 990. 
36 IRS FORM 990, Part VI (2010). The organization is asked to respond 'yes' only if a copy 
of the organization's final Form 990, including required schedules, as ultimately filed with 
the Service, was provided to each voting member of the governing body of the organization, 
whether in paper or electronic form, prior to its filing with the Service. The organization must 
also describe in Schedule 0 the process, if any, by which any of the organization's officers, 
directors, trustees, board committee members, or management reviewed the prepared Form 
990, whether before or after it was filed with the Service, including specifics regarding who 
conducted the review, when they conducted it, and the extent of any such review. If no review 
was conducted, the organization must so state. 
37 Dandridge, supra note 31, at 713. 
38 PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, INDEPENDENT SECTOR, PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD 
GOVERNANCE AND ETHICAL PRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR CHARITIES AND FOUNDATIONS (2007), avail-
able at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/report/principles/principles-..guide.pdf. 
39 See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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after it files the Form 990-N. I am less certain that the notification to the 
states will result in much greater contact than exists at the federal level.40 
Professor Dandridge's paper offers a useful framework for dealing with the 
difficult issues that affect smaller nonprofits. 
IV. FEDERAL REGULATION OF NONPROFIT BOARD INDEPENDENCE: Focus ON 
THIRD-PARTY STAKEHOLDERS AS A "MIDDLE PATH" 
Professor Benjamin Leffviews the problem offederal regulation through 
a law and economics prism, a creative and interesting focus. 41 He believes 
the government under certain circumstances has a legitimate interest in 
charity board independence and develops what seems to be a probable cause 
standard of private benefit, whereby third-party stakeholders can assist in 
evaluating whether exemption should be conditioned on the existence of 
some sort· of independent board.42 Both the Service and Professor Leff 
place great faith in board independence. Does board independence 
have an impact on good governance or organizational probity? Professor 
Dana Brakman Reiser has questioned the value of independence in the 
nonprofit context.43 Few state jurisdictions require independent members 
of a nonprofit Board. The argument that the Service does not require 
governance procedures is to favor form over substance.44 If as.ChiefJustice 
John Marshall wrote, "The power to tax involves the power to destroy,"45 
the power to grant or withhold recognition of tax exemption is the power to 
bully and impose the Service's desired governance structures. Questions 
on the Service's forms must be answered, and the Form 990 questions 
on corporate governance procedures and conflict of interest policies are 
reviewable by donors-a very strong incentive to comply with the Service's 
wishes. 
What justification is there that independent board members will be 
effective as third-party stakeholders? The law gives few rights to third-
party stakeholders. Members and directors can bring suit, although this 
rarely happens, but donors cannot. The Service's approach is wishful 
thinking. Even with an independent board, independence does not mean 
40 Dandridge, supra note 31, at 727. 
41 Benjamin Moses LetT, Federal Regulation of Nonprofit Board Independence: Focus on 
Third-Party Stakeholders as a "Middle Path" 99 Ky. L.]. 731 (2011). 
42 /d. at 780. 
43 Dana Brakman Reiser, The InCf~osing Resemblance of Nonprofit and Business Organizations 
Low: Director Independence in the Independent Sector, 76 FORDHAM. L. REV. 795, 797-798 (2007). 
Professor Brakman Reiser also concludes that director independence makes a relatively lim-
ited contribution in addressing real accountability issues facing nonprofit organizations. [d. at 
83 1-32. 
44 LetT, supra note 41, at 733 & n.8, 734 n.lO, 737-38 & nn. 23-26, 739 & nn. 29, 32,740 
(discussing and citing relevant IRS statements and publications). 
45 McCulloch v. Matyland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). 
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the individual director will be a monitor or gatekeeper. Daniel Kurtz, a 
longtime practitioner in the nonprofit area, has written that "probing 
questions by charity board members have been viewed as 'simply 
bad manners."'46 There is no empirical data to support the view that 
independence matters.47 
One has no problem when the Service goes after an organization if there 
is definite evidence of private purpose. Certain areas of the sector deserve 
more scrutiny than others, credit counseling bureaus for instance. It may 
be that an independent board is a proxy for such scrutiny, but to extend 
that requirement throughout the sector makes little sense. The Service's 
approach-presuming that a nonprofit organization whose founders sit on 
its board is likely to confer excess benefits to them or advance their private 
interests-is akin to arresting people because they look like troublemakers. 
It is uncertain that an independent board would cure that situation. The 
risk of private purpose if an organization is dominated by founders may 
be a reason to deny exemption to some nonprofits, but surely should not 
create a presumption against all. Nor can one overestimate the difficulty 
of finding board members, independent or otherwise. A 2007 study by the 
Urban Institute found that seventy percent of the organizations surveyed 
stated it was difficult to find new board members. Twenty percent said 
very difficult.48 
The federal emphasis differs from state law, which does not prescribe 
specific corporate governance approaches. State law promotes flexibility in 
organizational structure, allowing organizations to develop the appropriate 
structures and policies most suitable in the board's vision. 
The description of the Service's model conflict of interest argument 
demonstrates its departure from existing state law.49 Under both New York 
law and the Model Act, the transaction described as impermissible could 
be approved. Under the typical state conflict of interest statute, there is 
a procedure for the organization or the board to review a conflict. The 
statutes mandate disclosure. If the procedures are not followed or there is 
46 Felicity Barringer, ChanO' Boards Learn to be Skeptical, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 199z, at 10. 
47 Empirical studies of for-profit corporations have shown little correlation between 
board independence and increase in firm value. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non· 
Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Tenn Finn Perfonnance, 27 j. CORP. L. 231, 
z33 (2002); Kathleen M. Boozang, Does An Independent Board Improve Nonprofit Corporate 
Governance.?, 75 TENN. L. REV. 83, 84 (Z007); Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance 
Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A MoraliO' Tale for the Policymakers Too, 2Z GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 251, 255-57 (2005); Roberta Romano, TheSarbanes-OxleyActandtlreMakingofQuack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.j. 1521, 1528'31 (ZOOS). There have been no empirical stud-
ies relating to the impact of good nonprofit governance on mission outcome. 
48 FRANCIE OSTROWER, CTR. ON NONPROFITS AND PHILANTHROPY, URBAN INST., NONPROFIT 
GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS ON PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM 
THE FIRST NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE STUDY 16 (Z007). 
49 Leff, supra note 4 I, at 738. 
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not a disinterested majority of the board to approve, the only consequence 
is that the burden of proof shifts to the board in proving the fairness of the 
transaction to the organization at the time it was entered intO.50 Impliedly, 
the Service views conflicts as a bad thing. State nonprofit law proceeds 
from a different perspective. Interested transactions are common and 
cannot be avoided even if there is full disclosure of them. 
Professor Leff's analysis of private letter rulings is very informative and 
provides added texture to the debate. Interestingly, he finds that in many 
of the adverse determination letters the organization should have been 
clearly classified as a private foundation.51 One can only wonder how many 
of the organizations whose applications for exemption were rejected would 
have been saved by better lawyering. 
Professor Leff states: "organizations with no meaningful independent 
stakeholders are low on the state's priority list but high on the federal 
government's priority list in both cases because of the lack of independent 
stakeholders."52 This is a useful distinction but one not made by federal or 
state regulators. This is a well-reasoned and provocative paper and any of 
my disagreements with the points it makes do not diminish that fact. 
V. THE "FEDERALIZATION" PROBLEM AND NONPROFIT SELF-REGULATION: 
SOME INITIAL THOUGHTS 
Professor Mark Sidel notes two perhaps contradictory trends in the 
regulation and self-regulation of the nonprofit sector. First, federalization of 
nonprofit regulation is increasing, and second, increased federal regulation 
is matched by the development and spread of nonprofit self-regulation.53 
He points out the importance of self-regulation. Without question, self-
regulatory structures are important contributors to the integrity and health 
of various parts of the nonprofit sector and beyond. With weaknesses and 
lapses in government oversight, self-regulation is indispensable for setting 
standards, identifying inappropriate and illegal behavior, reaffirming norms 
of behavior, and improving the integrity and efficiency of the nonprofit 
sector. However, self-regulation has its limitations. 
The National Center on Philanthropy and the Law (NCPL) has 
examined self-regulation throughout the nonprofit sector. NCPL's Study 
on Models of Self-Regulation in the Nonprofit Sector concluded that "[e) 
xpectations ... should remain nuanced .... If the virtues of self-regulation 
are trumpeted with too much enthusiasm, disappointment is inevitable 
SO See, N.¥. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 7Is(b) (McKinney zooS); MODEL NONPROFIT 
CORP. ACT § 8.60(a) (zo08). 
51 LefT, supra note 41, at 762-63. 
SZ LefT, supra note 41, at 780. 
53 Mark Side!, The "Federalization" Problem and Nonprofit Self-Regulation: Some Initial 
Thoughts, 99 Ky. L.J. 783, 783-84 (ZOI I). 
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when scandals eventually occur."54 It added that the "most significant 
factor contributing to the effectiveness of any self-regulatory model is legal 
enforceability of its standards."55 So, for self-regulation to be effective, it 
must be backed by legal sanction or accreditation, which can be revoked 
by the accrediting body. 
A problem with self-regulation is that there are always outliers, 
sometimes in unexpected places. For instance, the land trust community, 
mentioned by Professor Sidel as a positive example of the self-regulatory 
model,56 had a serious scandal involving its largest and most established 
member, the Nature ConservancyY Professor Sidel also cites the example 
of community foundations, where self-regulation seems to work well.58 
However, there are a limited number of community foundations, somewhat 
in excess of seven hundred. 59 They are particularly visible organizations in . 
their communities, and their boards consist of the local worthies. 
The securities area, indeed all financial services, is not such a good 
example of the self-regulatory model. As Professor Sidel mentions, the 
securities and financial services areas have a long history of self-regulation, 
and there is a substantial amount of interchange between self-regulatory 
organizations (SROs) and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).60 The success of securities and financial services self-regulation is 
mixed. Self-regulation did not stop the financial crisis, and if one examines 
the history of the relationship between the SEC and SROs, one finds an 
ongoing need for Congress to give the SEC enhanced powers over SROS.61 
Too often self-regulation becomes self-protection. 
Self-regulation by industry or organizational type typically reflects the 
norms of the more established and larger groups. One of the curious aspects 
of the Service's corporate governance initiative is the response of both 
Independent Sector and many non profits that voluntarily adopted certain 
Sarbanes-Oxley principles, even though that statute only applies to public 
corporations. This has had a trickle-down effect to smaller organizations 
54 NAT'L CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY & THE LAW, STUDY ON MODELS OF SELF-REGULATION 
IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 61 (Draft 2005), avoilable at http://wwwLlaw.nyu.edu/ncpl/pdfsl 
Self%20Regulation%20Final%20Report-040307updates.pdf. 
55/d· 
56 Side!, supra note 53, at 784. 
57 See Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Nonprofit Land Bank Amasses Billions; Charity 
Builds Assets on Corporate Partnerships, WASH. POST, May 4,2003, at AI; Joe Stephens & David 
B. Ottaway, Landing a Big One: Preseroation, Private Development, WASH. POST, May 4, 2003, at 
A9; Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Senators Question Conseroancy's Practices; End to 'Insider' 
and 'Side' Deals by Nonprofit Organizations Is Urged, WASH. POST, June 8, 2005, at A3. 
58 Sidel, supra note 53, at 784. 
59/d· 
60 Side!, supra note 53, at 788-89. 
61 See generally Sam Scott Miller, Self-R£gulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical 
Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853 (1985). 
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with all the burdens it entails.6z 
Professor Sidel's discussion of the types and experiments of comparative 
self-regulation is particularly enlightening. Our nonprofit sector has much 
to learn from other countries. Although the social science literature has 
produced interesting work, very little has been published in legal journals. 
Professor Sidel has been a major contributor in both venues.63 One issue 
with adopting some foreign approaches is the question of scale. For 
instance, Professor Sidel points out that the Philippines has certified 1000 
organizations.64 There may be more than 1000 art museums in the United 
States. Certainly, nonprofit self-regulation should be nurtured, but it is a 
complement to effective direct regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues raised in these four fine papers will be with us for the 
foreseeable future. Thanks are owed to Professor Nancy McLaughlin of 
the University of Utah Law School and to Dean David Brennen of the 
University of Kentucky College of Law for organizing the program on 
The Federalization of Nonprofit and Charity Law at the AALS 2011 Annual 
Meeting. The extent of the federal regulatory role over non profits will be 
played out in the coming years. Thanks to the Kentucky Law Journal, these 
articles will be part of that discussion. 
6z Fishman,supra note 3, at 575-78. 
63 See, e.g., Mark Sidel, The Guardians Guarding Themselves: A Comparative Perspective on 
Nonprofit Se(f-R£gulation, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803 (ZOOS); Mary Kay Gtigerty, Mark Sidel 
& Angela L. Bies, Introduction to Minisymposium, Nonprofit Self-Regulation in Comparative 
Perspective-Themes and Debates, 39 NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. IOz7 (ZOIO), available 
at http://nvs.sagepub.comlcontent/39/6/IOZ7; Mark Sidel, The Promise and Limits of Collective 
Action for Nonprofit Self-Regulation: Evidence from Asia, 39 NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR 
Q 1039 (zo 10), available at http://nvs.sagepub.comlcontent/39/6/1039. 
64 Sidel, supra note 53, at 793. 
